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Introduction
The market for the services of residential real estate brokerage ﬁrms has seen considerable
change in recent years. One dramatic change is a result of new computer technology that
has increased the formation of regional multiple listing services (MLS) versus the
traditional MLS for one city. Some concern exists that the residential brokerage business
is moving toward domination by large national and regional ﬁrms. Michael Selz (1990) in
a Wall Street Journal article reports that more than a half dozen of the largest national
brokerage ﬁrms and the twenty-ﬁve largest regional ﬁrms handle more than 40% of
houses sold. In the same article, Selz indicates that Richard Loughlin, chief executive
ofﬁcer of Century 21 Real Estate Corporation, predicted that the largest companies’
share of the business would grow to 60% by 1995. These estimates are for homes that are
sold through local multiple listing services and exclude new houses that are typically sold
by developers.
The residential real estate brokerage industry is considered to have few barriers to
entry with numerous companies offering what is perceived to be essentially the same
service. In an industry with such low barriers to entry we would expect to ﬁnd
insigniﬁcant concentration levels. However, it is possible that at the ﬁrm level, brokerage
ﬁrms are able to establish dominant positions in a market and thus command a large
percentage of market share. Selz’s (1990) comments support the view that considerable
residential brokerage ﬁrm concentration exists and that it may be increasing.
In this study we examine brokerage ﬁrm concentration in a multiple listing service
setting. We estimate the market structure of brokerage ﬁrms in an MLS over the 1992–95
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Abstract. This study provides empirical evidence regarding brokerage ﬁrm concentration in
a local market multiple listing service setting over the years 1992–1995. To evaluate the
level of brokerage ﬁrm concentration in this market, Gini Coefﬁcients, Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Indices and Concentration Ratios for each year of the study period are
calculated. Our results indicate that for ﬁrms responsible for listing properties, ﬁrm
concentration has not varied substantially over the four-year study period. However, for
those ﬁrms that were responsible for actually selling properties, ﬁrm concentration has
decreased over the study period. This ﬁnding tends to indicate that the MLS now provides
greater exposure to a wide variety of sales ﬁrms, therefore leading to a higher level of
competition with a lower level of concentration for selling ﬁrms in this local market.period. Market structure in terms of brokerage ﬁrm sales from both the listing ﬁrm’s and
the selling ﬁrm’s perspective is estimated. Even though the national ﬁgures provided by
Selz (1990) suggest increased concentration in the brokerage industry, this picture may be
misleading due to the fact that on the supply side the market has traditionally been
localized. Therefore, although in our study we focus on brokerage ﬁrm concentration in
one Texas city, it is believed that this study is of importance nationally, as it indicates the
likely situation throughout the country.
This study is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of several
studies that are concerned with market structure of the real estate industry. The third
section presents our sample and summary statistics. The fourth section discusses the
methodology. Section ﬁve reports our empirical ﬁndings and the last section contains our
conclusions.
Related Studies
Several studies related to market structure in the real estate industry provided insights for
the analysis presented in this work. Following the development of the MLS, market
structure of the real estate industry received increased attention. For example, Miller and
Shedd (1979) reviewed court decisions regarding whether market information gained
from the MLS can be reserved only for the members of the local realty board who joined
the MLS. In addition, they dealt with the question of whether the existence of uniform
commission rates necessarily indicates illegal price ﬁxing. They drew the conclusion that
‘‘as brokerage ﬁrms continue to grow larger and franchise afﬁliations increase, collusion
among a fewer number of ﬁrms becomes easier and subject to increasing scrutiny.’’
Colwell and Marshall (1986) empirically analyzed market share in the real estate
brokerage industry. Their analysis was especially valuable in developing some of the
methodology used in our study. In particular, one part of their study uses the Gini
Coefﬁcient as a measure of dispersion of listings or sales among brokerage ﬁrms. In an
application to Champaign County, Illinois for the years 1980 and 1981, Colwell and
Marshall (1986) state that their results indicate ‘‘a high level of concentration but not so
high as to indicate the presence of monopoly power or even a dominant ﬁrm.’’
Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993) empirically estimated an average cost curve that
reﬂects the effects of ﬁrm size on the production costs of residential real estate brokerage
ﬁrms. Their results show that after an initial sharp decline in average costs with an
increase in ﬁrm size, average costs remain essentially constant over a wide range of
outputs. Data for their analysis come from a national, cross-section sample of real estate
brokerage ﬁrms that derived at least 75% of their revenues from residential real estate
transactions.
Although Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995) were not concerned directly with brokerage ﬁrm
concentration, their analysis does emphasize the impact of size of the brokerage ﬁrm
upon Time On the Market (TOM) for a sample of single-family home sales in State Park,
Pennsylvania in 1991. Their ﬁndings indicate that size of the listing ﬁrm does not have a
signiﬁcant impact on TOM.
An empirical investigation of the market structure of the real estate agents industry in
the 1980s in the U.K. was conducted by Dietrich and Holmes (1990). Their study
analyzes changes that occurred in seller concentration and geographical diversiﬁcation
using a data set of all real estate agents in the Lyneside area. The four-ﬁrm Concentration
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analysis shows that following 1983 there was a sharp rise in concentration due to the
entry of large ﬁnancial institutions.
Data
The data used in this study consists of residential transactions sold over the period
January 1992 through December 1995. The Multiple Listing Service’s Property Sold
records for a city of approximately 250,000 in Texas supplied the information identifying
the listing ﬁrm, selling ﬁrm and the sale price. These three variables were obtained for
11,937 of 12,307 properties sold over this period. The sample includes all sales, but only
the listings that resulted in sales. The 11,937 sales represent 96.99% of the total trans-
actions. Total number of transactions was obtained from the Texas A&M University Real
Estate Center TRENDS publication. We were unable to obtain any information on the
remaining 3.01% of the transactions. Of the 11,937 sample sales, 2,838 occurred in 1992,
3,082 in 1993, 2,954 in 1994, and 3,063 sales were reported for 1995. The average sales
price over the entire sample is $96,013, with an average of $90,277 for 1992, $97,222 for
1993, $95,917 for 1994, and $100,204 for 1995.
Methodology
This study will ﬁrst use the Gini Coefﬁcient to measure the dispersion of residential sales
among brokerage ﬁrms. Then two direct measures of market concentration, the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index and the Concentration Ratio, are calculated. The avail-
ability of sales price allows us to calculate market concentration based upon dollar
volume instead of in terms of numbers of listings and sales.1 The measures of dispersion
and market concentration are calculated for the year for each ﬁrm in terms of dollar
volume and only those listings that resulted in a sale are included in the data.
Derivation of a Gini Coefﬁcient can be illustrated by comparing areas on a graph
which depict a Lorenz curve. In Exhibit 1 the cumulative percentage of residential sales is
measured on the vertical axis and the cumulative percentage of brokerage ﬁrms, ranked
from smallest to largest based upon dollar volume sales, is measured on the horizontal
axis. If sales are equally dispersed among all ﬁrms then, for example, the smallest 25% of
the ﬁrms will account for 25% of the industry’s sales. Thus, perfect equality in the
dispersion of sales among the industry’s ﬁrms is represented by a diagonal line with a 45-
degree slope. The actual dispersion of sales is represented by a Lorenz curve that reﬂects
that, for example, the smallest 25% of the ﬁrms may account for only 10% of total sales.
Thus, the closer the Lorenz curve lies to the line of equality, the more equally sales are
distributed among ﬁrms. Conversely, the further the Lorenz curve is bowed away from
the 45-degree line, the greater the degree of inequality in the distribution of sales. The
Gini Coefﬁcient permits a convenient measure of the degree of inequality. The Gini
Coefﬁcient is calculated as:
where X equals number of sales and P is the number of brokerage ﬁrms. The resulting
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MARKET STRUCTURE IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 109entire area below the line of equality.2 Therefore, the larger the Gini Coefﬁcient, the more
unequal the distribution of sales. Thus, complete inequality (pure monopoly) will yield a
ratio of 1, and perfect equality, a ratio of 0.
A small Gini Coefﬁcient means that there is little inequality among ﬁrms in sales. An
inference could be made that in this case there are no large ﬁrms accounting for a high
percent of sales. That is, there is a small degree of market concentration. However, this
may or may not be the case. For example, a Gini Coefﬁcient of 0 (perfect equality) is
derived whether there are two ﬁrms in the industry with equal sales or forty ﬁrms with
equal sales. The degree of market concentration, however, differs signiﬁcantly.
Thus, while a measure of dispersion provides useful information about market
structure, it must be used with caution for inferences regarding market concentration.
Thus, we supplement the information provided by the Gini Coefﬁcient with
Concentration Ratios and the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. The Concentration Ratio
measures the proportion of total industry sales accounted for by the largest selected
ﬁrms. It is deﬁned as:
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Lorenz Curvewhere N is the number of ﬁrms ranked from the largest to the smallest and ci is the number
of sales for the ith ﬁrm, and T is the total number of sales in the market. If one chooses to
consider the four largest ﬁrms the Concentration Ratio is designated CR4, as opposed, for
example, to CR8 if one chooses to consider the eight largest ﬁrms. The Concentration
Ratio also has a principal limitation, since it measures concentration at only one point on
the size distribution of ﬁrms. For example, suppose that in a given year CR4550 and
CR8575 and that ﬁve years later in the same industry CR4545 and CR8580. This leaves
open the question of whether the industry has become more or less concentrated.
The last measure of market concentration we calculated is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
Index which is deﬁned as:
where Si is the percentage of total industry sales (market share) by the ith ﬁrm and N is
the number of ﬁrms in the industry. Thus, the index is the sum of the squares of the
market share percentages of all ﬁrms in the industry. A value of 1, or 100%, for the index
would indicate only one selling ﬁrm (a pure monopoly market structure). The HHI is
often presented as an integer where 100% is equivalent to 10,000. The index value
declines as the number of ﬁrms increase and increases as inequality among a given
number of ﬁrms increases. The HHI weights the market shares for large ﬁrms more
heavily than for small ﬁrms as indicated by the squaring of market shares.
As in the case of the Gini Coefﬁcient, the value of the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
can be misleading as a measure of market concentration. For example, the index will be
equal to approximately .17 (1700) in each of the following cases: (1) an industry
composed of two large ﬁrms with market shares of 25% each and ﬁve small ﬁrms selling
10% each, or (2) an industry composed of six ﬁrms with each selling 16.67% of the
market total. Clearly, market concentration is considered higher in the ﬁrst instance.
Given that each of the three measures of dispersion/concentration has some
limitations, we estimate all three. Consideration of all three measures provides a more
informative picture of market structure for a given market. However, our interpretation
of the results are inﬂuenced most heavily by the Department of Justice’s shift from
Concentration Ratios to the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index in 1982 when new merger
guidelines were announced.3
Results
The data was divided into the following two groups: (1) Listing Ofﬁce/Firm and (2)
Selling Ofﬁce/Firm. The Listing Ofﬁce/Firm results are presented in Exhibit 2 and the
Selling Ofﬁce/Firm results are presented in Exhibit 3. The Listing Ofﬁce/Firm group is
comprised of those brokerage ﬁrms that listed any properties that were subsequently sold,
either by the same ﬁrm or another ﬁrm. Firms responsible for listing properties that did
not sell were unavailable for the analysis. The Selling Ofﬁce/Firm group is comprised of
the brokerage ﬁrms that sold any properties during the study period, whether they were
listed by the same ﬁrm or another ﬁrm.
A word of explanation is required for the large increase during the 1992–95 time period
in the number of listing ﬁrms (from 53 to 134) and the number of selling ﬁrms (from 64








MARKET STRUCTURE IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 111to 198). After discussing this issue with the MLS, the conclusion was reached that this
increase in both listing and selling brokerage ﬁrms is primarily attributed to two items.
First, there was a net increase in new ﬁrms entering the market in 1993 primarily due to
the increase in market activity and the drop in interest rates. Second, the MLS expanded
from a local/city MLS to a regional/county MLS. When this transition occurred in
February 1994, the monthly fees dropped from $72.50 to approximately $25 per month.
Thus, brokerage ﬁrms already active in the market were more willing to join the MLS.
The combination of both factors resulted in a considerable increase in the number of
ﬁrms during 1994 with stabilization in 1995. These factors are undoubtedly signiﬁcant in
explaining some of the reduction in the concentration measures that follow. 
Interpretation of Gini Coefﬁcients
As previously mentioned, the Gini Coefﬁcients are indicative of the dispersion of resi-
dential sales among all participating brokerage ﬁrms. The relatively large values of the
Gini Coefﬁcients indicate the market for both listing and selling ﬁrms is characterized by
a high degree of inequality in the distributions of sales. The Gini Coefﬁcient increased for
the listing ﬁrms from .7948 in 1992 to a peak of .8872 in 1994 and fell slightly to .8760 in
1995. For selling ﬁrms the Gini Coefﬁcient had the same trend, increasing from .7851 in
1992 to .8463 in 1995. Thus, inequality in the distribution of sales among both listing and
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Exhibit 2
Listing Brokerage Firm Concentration over the 1992–1995 Period
Year of Sale 1992 1993 1994 1995
Number of Sales 2838 3082 2954 3063
Listing Ofﬁce/Firm
1. Number of Listing ﬁrms with sales 53 80 109 134
2. Gini Coefﬁcient 0.7948 0.8468 0.8827 0.8760
3. CR4 for listing ﬁrms 0.5561 0.5670 0.5829 0.5625
4. CR8 for listing ﬁrms 0.8143 0.8223 0.8266 0.7823
5. Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.1027 0.1012 0.1069 0.0951
5a. Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (10000s) 1027 1012 1069 951
Exhibit 3
Selling Brokerage Firm Concentration over the 1992–1995 Period
Year of Sale 1992 1993 1994 1995
Number of Sales 2838 3082 2954 3063
Selling Ofﬁce/Firm
1. Number of Selling ﬁrms with sales 64 112 204 198
2. Gini Coefﬁcient 0.7851 0.8364 0.8530 0.8463
3. CR4 for selling ﬁrms 0.4717 0.4609 0.4419 0.4518
4. CR8 for selling ﬁrms 0.7520 0.7177 0.6622 0.6629
5. Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.0821 0.0755 0.0652 0.0672
5a. Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (10000s) 821 755 652 672selling brokerage ﬁrms increased during this time period, although in both cases the
coefﬁcient was slightly smaller in 1995 than in 1994.
Interpretation of Concentration Ratios
The Concentration Ratios provide a measure of the proportion of total market sales
accounted for by the largest ﬁrms. Two Concentration Ratios, CR4 deﬁned as the
percentage of the market held by the four largest ﬁrms, and CR8 deﬁned as the percentage
of the market held by the eight largest ﬁrms, were calculated for this study. Looking at the
ﬁrm identiﬁcation code, the same set of ﬁrms hold the top positions each year.
Speciﬁcally, the CR4 indicates that over the sample period that four of the listing ﬁrms
maintained on average 56.71% of the market for listings that eventually sold. The CR8 on
average is 81.14% for listing ﬁrms. There is a slight increase in concentration for listing
ﬁrms over the period 1992–94, with a slight drop in the 1995 estimate for both the CR4
and CR8 value. Overall, based upon the Concentration Ratios, the market concentration
of the listing ﬁrms is reasonably stable over the period of our study. We ﬁnd no evidence
that the largest listing ﬁrms are increasing their share of the market in this local market.
The Concentration Ratios for the selling ﬁrms are less consistent. The CR4 indicates a
reasonably stable concentration level, with four ﬁrms on average accounting for 45.66%
of the dollar volume of sales over the sample period with a standard deviation of 1.27%.
However, we ﬁnd a standard deviation of 4.4% with a mean of 69.87% for the CR8. From
1992 to 1995, the largest four selling ﬁrms saw their market share decline by 4.22%, while
the largest eight selling ﬁrms experienced a decline of 11.85% of their market share.
Based upon Concentration Ratios, our results provide no evidence that ﬁrms in the
brokerage industry are increasing their market share. On the contrary, the results suggest
that due to technological advances and the resulting increased competition, the level of
concentration in residential brokerage may be declining.
Interpretation of Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indices
The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) provide a measure of the degree of market
concentration among all participating brokerage ﬁrms in a speciﬁed market. The Justice
Department’s merger guidelines indicate that for markets with HHI values below 1000, a
merger challenge is deemed unlikely.4 Listing ﬁrms have an average HHI value of 1015.
This value lies in the range (between 1000 and 1800) where the Justice Department is
unlikely to challenge a merger unless the HHI value would be increased by 100 points by
the merger. Based upon these guidelines, we conclude that the level of concentration for
the listing ﬁrms should not be a signiﬁcant concern. We do ﬁnd a decrease in the HHI
value to 951 in 1995, indicating a lower level of concentration than the prior three years.
Over the period 1992 (HHI51072) to 1995 (HHI5951), there is a 7.4% decrease in the
level of market concentration for listing ﬁrms based on the changes in the HHI.
Selling ﬁrms have an average HHI value of 725 over the sample period. The largest
value was 821 in 1992 and the lowest value was 652 in 1994. Over the four-year period
there is a 18.15% decrease in the HHI value. For all years the value of the HHI indicates
that the level of concentration for selling ﬁrms, given the Department of Justice’s
guidelines, is not a major concern. Additionally, the results tend to support the conclu-
sion that the level of market concentration has decreased over the 1992–95 period for the
selling ﬁrms.
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The purpose of this research was to empirically evaluate the degree of concentration for
residential real estate brokerage ﬁrms in a local MLS setting over the period 1992–95.
Gini Coefﬁcients, Concentration Ratios and Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indices were used to
determine the level of concentration in the market for both listing and selling brokerage
ﬁrms.
Although the Gini Coefﬁcients indicate less equality among ﬁrms in the distribution
of sales, the CR4, CR8 and HHI measures indicate that a slight reduction in concen-
tration among selling brokerage ﬁrms has occurred during the study period, 1992–95,
while the concentration of listing ﬁrms has remained relatively unchanged. These results
are consistent with Richard Loughlin’s estimate that the largest companies share of the
residential brokerage business would be above 60% in 1995. The results indicate that the
largest eight ﬁrms had market share above 65% for selling ﬁrms and above 75% for
listing ﬁrms for all years. However, there is no evidence that the level of market
concentration is increasing. Additionally, our results suggest that the level of
concentration found in this analysis of a local residential brokerage market is unlikely to
be a cause for concern based upon Justice Department guidelines and the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index values.
One possible explanation of the results of this study is that increased competition
brought about by greater exposure through an expanded regional MLS has led to a
marginal decrease in market concentration by selling ﬁrms. Listing ﬁrms on the other
hand seem to be relatively unaffected by this change. These ﬁndings tend to indicate that
the MLS now provides greater exposure to a wide variety of sales ﬁrms, therefore leading
to a higher level of competition with a lower level of concentration for selling ﬁrms in this
local market.
Notes
1The results are essentially identical whether we use number of listings and sales or dollar volume
of listings and dollar volume of sales. Given the availability of sales prices, we provide the results of
our calculations of market concentration based upon dollar volume.
2In this study the Gini Coefﬁcient is calculated by a procedure developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki.
(See Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1984, pp. 363–68 for a more complete discussion.)
3The Department of Justice shifted its focus to the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index in 1982 when new
merger guidelines were announced. The merger guidelines indicate that for markets with HHI
values above 1800, mergers that would increase the HHI value by 100 points or more would
‘‘likely’’ be challenged. For markets with HHI values below 1000, a merger challenge is deemed
unlikely. (See Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 184–88 for a more complete discussion.)
4For the real estate industry, we know of no speciﬁed or calculated critical value for the HHI. Thus
we assume that the general guidelines of the Department of Justice is a reasonable proxy to
determine if the HHI indicates a ‘‘high level’’ of concentration.
References
Colwell, P. F. and D. W. Marshall, Market Share in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry, AREUEA
Journal, 1986, 14, 583–99.
Dietrich, M. and P. Holmes, The Market Structure of the Estate Agents Industry in the 1980s: An
Empirical Investigation, Applied Economics, 1990, 22, 629–38.
114 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1/2, 1997Lerman, R. I. and S. Yitzhaki, A Note on the Calculation and Interpretation of the Gini Index,
Economics Letters, 1984, 15, 363–68.
Miller, N. G. and P. J. Shedd, Do Antitrust Laws Apply to the Real Estate Brokerage Industry?,
American Business Law Journal, 1979, 17, 313–39.
Scherer, F. M. and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Boston:
Houghton Mifﬂin, 1990.
Selz, M., In Real Estate, Big Beats Small in Many Cases, Wall Street Journal, February 13, 190, B1,
B3.
Yang, S. X. and A. Yavas ¸, Bigger is Not Better: Brokerage and Time on the Market, Journal of Real
Estate Research, 1995, 10, 23–33.
Zumpano, L. V., H. W. Elder and G. E. Crellin, The Market for Residential Real Estate Brokerage
Services: Costs of Production and Economies of Scale, Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 1993, 6, 237–50.
MARKET STRUCTURE IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 115